

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

National Intelligence Officers

13 April 1981

NOTE FOR:

FROM : A/NIO/W

SUBJECT : Agenda for April NIC Warning
Meeting

Attached agenda is for your information.

Attachment

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13 April 1981

NIC WARNING AGENDA FOR APRIL

I. Poland

Alternative Assumptions:

A. The Sejm's approval of Jaruzelski's request for a suspension of strikes for two months falls far short of the firm actions demanded by the Soviets. Jaruzelski's failure to request special powers under a state of emergency surprised and angered the Soviets because they were operating on the assumption that the Polish leaders, under strong Soviet pressure, had agreed to a crackdown.

—Soviet expectations were reflected in Brezhnev's 7 April speech in Prague: "Polish Communists...will be able...to give a necessary rebuff to the schemes of the enemies of the socialist system." In the Soviets' view, the Poles have again reneged on commitments to move against KOR leaders and Solidarity militants—a repetition of previous Polish backdowns following the Warsaw Pact summit in December and the Soviet-Polish talks on 4 March.

—The Soviets will continue to press the Poles to act and will work behind the scenes with Polish hardliners to provoke further incidents like the Bydgoszcz affair in order to force another confrontation with Solidarity.

—Moscow and its allies in the Polish party must act in the next two months to block the scheduled elections of party officials and delegates to the party congress in July. A secret ballot and multiple candidates would not only mean the disappearance of a Soviet-style Leninist party but the elimination of the hardliners.

—If Kania and Jaruzelski proceed with party elections, the Soviets will attempt to replace them with more "reliable" hardliners. Brezhnev's talks with Olszowski in Prague probably prepared the ground for such an attempt.

B. Although Jaruzelski's program offered minimal satisfaction to the Soviets, they believe that the Polish leadership will henceforth be obliged to adopt a firmer

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attitude in dealing with Solidarity demands and that the Poles will take punitive actions against KOR and Solidarity militants who violate public order and laws.

—The Soviets will press the Poles to enforce Jaruzelski's implied warning that the armed forces would ensure the "unhampered functioning" of railroad and other transportation, communications, pipelines, and the defense industry.

—Speeches by Brezhnev in Prague and Suslov and Honecker in East Berlin, together with the announced termination of SOYUZ-il, signal a temporary relaxation of pressure on the Polish leadership.

—If Solidarity and the Polish hardliners refrain from early attempts to disrupt this truce, the situation will remain relatively calm until the Polish party elections reopen the struggle for power and policy in the Polish leadership.

C. Brezhnev's speech, which reaffirmed his guarded expressions of confidence in the Polish party's ability to overcome the crisis issued in late October and early December signals at least a temporary ascendancy of the "moderate" non-interventionist faction in the Soviet leadership. (Brezhnev was obliged to omit this formulation in his report to the CPSU congress in late February). A showdown within the Polish leadership over party elections, however, may reopen divisions in Moscow.

—Although the outcome of the tests precipitated by the Bydgoszcz incident on 19 March does not represent a clear turning point in the protracted Polish crisis, the avoidance of a showdown has bought time for the moderates in the Polish leadership and Solidarity to resume efforts to work out a more durable accommodation. It is too early to judge the effects of this outcome on the balance of power within the Soviet leadership. [REDACTED] however, has ventured that it is still "conceivable" that, barring another severe confrontation in Poland, the Soviets "could be brought to live in practice with a situation they would reject in principle as inherently contradictory: a Poland with a more open political and economic system than the Soviets would approve, but one which remains loyal to its existing alliance."

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II. Lebanon

Assumption: The Phalangist move to force the issue of Syria's role to the forefront of international attention will pose growing risks of a resumption of the civil war.

—Although neither the Syrians nor the Israelis now intend to escalate their involvement, prolonged Phalangist resistance at Zahlah will compel the Israelis to increase their support for Bashir Jumayyil's forces, and this in turn may oblige the Syrians to order Lebanese Muslim leftists and the Palestinians to enter the fighting. Under these circumstances, aggravated sectarian antagonisms may bring about the collapse of the Lebanese army.

—If the contest for control of Zahlah is protracted, the approaching national elections will increase the Begin government's incentive to engage in stronger shows of strength in Lebanon and deepen its commitments to protect and support the Phalange militia.

—If the Palestinians intensify attacks against Haddad's forces in the south, the Israelis may seize the opportunity to occupy substantial territory in this region until the Syrians halt their attempts to drive the Phalange out of Zahlah.

III. USSR-Afghanistan-Pakistan

Assumption: Moscow's concern that the Reagan Administration intends to adopt a policy of more active military and political support of both Pakistan and the Afghan insurgents may lead to sharper Soviet pressures on the Zia regime.

—The Soviets now may be closer than ever before to carrying out periodic threats to take measures against insurgent bases in Pakistan and to increase subversive operations to destabilize Zia's power.

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
--At a minimum, the Soviets may authorize a repetition of last October's helicopter raids on two refugee camps 33 kilometers inside Pakistan.

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